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Law&Ethics

Strange Bedfellows

The Convergence of Sovereignty-Limiting Doctrines in
Counterterrorist and Human Rights Discourse
Rosa Brooks
It is hard to imagine two groups with less in common than
national security hawks and human rights activists. They
represent different cultures with different views on the use
of force, the role of rights, and the constraining power of
international law. Yet despite their differences, the two
groups seem to be converging on an understanding of state
sovereignty as limited and subject to de facto waiver—an
understanding that appears to legitimize military interventions even in the absence of state consent and Security
Council authorization.
This convergence is reached via different routes in each
community: for the national security community, counterterrorism provides the sovereignty-limiting logic, while for
the human rights and humanitarian law communities, it is
the prevention of atrocities that leads to sovereignty-limiting
doctrines.
The convergence is surprising. The human rights and
humanitarian law communities and the national security
community have historically differed in their views of the
centrality of national interests versus the centrality of inter-
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national institutions, laws, and norms.
They have also held different views on
the legitimacy and desirability of the
use of armed force to solve problems.
The national security community tends
to view international law as a political constraint, but not a significant
legal constraint, and sees the use (or at
least the credible threat) of force as an
essential means of protecting national
interests and promoting global security.
The human rights and humanitarian
law communities come from a different tradition, tending to regard the
narrow protection of national interests as inimical to the establishment
of a strong and normatively legitimate
international system, one that protects
rights through law, rather than force.
In this tradition, the use of force is
viewed as an occasionally unavoidable
necessity that should be tightly controlled by international law.
Despite these differences, as the
human rights and humanitarian law
communities grapple with the problem
of atrocity prevention, and the national
security community grapples with the
challenges posed by transnational terrorism, the two have arrived at strikingly
similar legal theories about sovereignty,
intervention, and the use of force.
Specifically, both the human rights and
humanitarian law and the counter-terrorism/national security law discourses
have come to rely increasingly on the
view that sovereignty is less a right but
a privilege—a privilege that is effectively
waived by states that fail to fulfill their
sovereign responsibilities, and when
waived, entitles other states to lawfully
use military force on the territory of the
“waiving” state.
This convergence of sovereignty-
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limiting doctrines is partial and uneasy,
but to the extent that it further opens
the door to the use of force on the
territories of non-consenting states,
it poses significant challenges—both to
the stability of the always-shaky international order, and to the convictions
and traditions of the human rights and
humanitarian communities.
In this essay, I want to trace how this
convergence has come about in two
very different discourse communities,
and point out some of the unintended
consequences and unresolved problems
that result.

Sovereignty-Limiting Doctrines in the Human Rights
and Humanitarian Law Communities. Start with human rights

and humanitarian law discourse. It has
become a truism to proclaim that Westphalian sovereignty is on its deathbed,
weakened first by the UN Charter and
the emergence of human rights law, and
now virtually eviscerated by globalization. For the human rights community, the big story is about the decline
of the state as the primary subject of
international law. Over a period of less
than a hundred years, international
law has ceased to be solely a matter of
the rights and duties of states vis-àvis other states—individuals also have
entered the international law picture.
The UN Charter spoke of fundamental human rights, and these were soon
elaborated in numerous UN resolutions and international human rights
treaties. Increasingly, states have begun
to accept that human rights law limits their internal sovereignty: after the
Holocaust, few were willing to advance
the position that states could do what-
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ever they wished inside their own borders. What is more, international law
began to give states obligations to act
to prevent human rights abuses inside
the territory of other states: under the
Genocide Convention, for instance,
states “undertake to prevent and to
punish” genocide.1
By the mid-1990s, a range of increasingly robust sovereignty-limiting institutions and efforts were emerging as
a result of the human rights revolution. Some were judicial, such as the
international criminal tribunals for
Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the International Criminal Court. Others were
political: the wars in the former Yugoslavia and the Rwandan genocide led
to a growing international willingness
to view humanitarian intervention as
legitimate, at least under limited circumstances. In the former Yugoslavia,
NATO’s intervention—though halfhearted and belated—occurred with UN
Security Council blessing.2
Even in the post-Cold War world
and when faced with the most egregious
of circumstances, however, the Security Council could not necessarily be
relied upon to authorize humanitarian interventions. During the Rwandan
genocide, the looming threat of vetoes
helped preclude meaningful Security
Council action, and the same was true
during the Kosovo crisis. In Kosovo,
though, when ethnic cleansing seemed
imminent, the NATO states opted
for military intervention even in the
absence of Security Council authorization. NATO’s justification was fundamentally extralegal in nature: it rested,
in effect, on a claim of moral necessity.3
The intervention likely saved thousands of lives, and was given a form
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of post hoc validation in subsequent
Security Council resolutions.4 Still, the
legal and moral dilemma was acute. In
a 1999 speech, then-UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan spelled it out:
State sovereignty, in its most basic
sense, is being redefined-not
least by the forces of globalization
and international cooperation.
States are now widely understood
to be instruments at the service
of their peoples, and not vice
versa...When we read the [UN]
Charter today, we are more than
ever concious that its aim is to
protect individual human beings,
not to protect those who abuse
them. The genocide in Rwanda
showed us how terrible the consequences of inaction can be…
But this year’s conflict in Kosovo
raised equally important questions…5
By the beginning of the twenty-first
century, the 1990s’ debates over humanitarian intervention had morphed
into discussion of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), a doctrine initially developed by the International
Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS). ICISS offered a
starkly different understanding of sovereignty than that taken for granted
prior to World War II:
State sovereignty implies responsibility…Where a population
is suffering serious harm, as a
result of internal war, insurgency,
repression or state failure, and
the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it,
the principle of non-intervention yields to the international
responsibility to protect.6
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ICISS was careful to note that military force should be a last resort, and
that any military interventions should be
authorized by the Security Council. But
ICISS was unwilling to view Security
Council authorization as an absolute
requirement:
“If the Security Council rejects
a proposal [to intervene to protect
a population] or fails to deal with
it in a reasonable time, alternative
options…[include] action within
area of jurisdiction by regional or
sub-regional organizations under
Chapter VIII of the Charter, subject to their seeking subsequent
authorization.”
After all, if the Council “fails to
discharge its responsibility to protect in
conscience-shocking situations crying
out for action,” warned ICISS, “concerned states may not rule out other
means to meet the gravity and urgency
of that situation…”7
Within a decade, both the United
States and the UN had offered R2P
at least a lukewarm embrace. In 2011,
the Security Council referenced R2P
in Resolution 1973, which authorized
the use of force to protect civilians in
Libya, and in Resolution 1975, authorizing the use of force in Cote d’Ivoire.8
For the human rights and humanitarian law communities, the trend towards
sovereignty-limiting doctrines premised on human rights had reached
its apotheosis. Though R2P’s implied
willingness to dispense with Security
Council authorization has not been put
to the test, it is difficult to doubt that
if another Kosovo-like situation arose,
concerned states might well take matters
into their own hands.9
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Back to the National Security
Community. Turning back now to

the national security community, we
see a parallel trend. Only two months
before ICISS issued its initial report on
R2P, the terrorist attacks of September
2011 shook up traditional notions of
sovereignty, self-defense, and armed
conflict.
Prior to 9/11, most states accepted
(publicly, at least) the general international law principle that force could
not be used inside the territory of
a sovereign state unless the state at
issue consented, the Security Council
had authorized the use of force under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or the
use of force was in self-defense following an “armed attack,” as delineated in
Article 51 of the UN Charter. Standard
interpretations of the right to selfdefense included the right to use force
to prevent an “imminent” attack, but
the idea of imminence was construed
narrowly.10
UN Charter provisions on the use of
force rest firmly on traditional understandings of sovereignty: as long as a
state refrained in its external actions
from threatening other states, the use
of force inside the territory of a nonconsenting sovereign state would be
unlawful.11 If a state chose to develop
or harbor terrorists, this was its own
business; unless terrorists carried out
attacks beyond its borders, no other
state had a legal basis to use force inside
the “harboring” state.
Though this principle was sometimes more honored in the breach, it
remained relatively unquestioned by
states until the 9/11 attacks. But 9/11
made glaringly apparent a trend that
had been underway for decades: glo-
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balization—and accompanying changes
in transportation, communication and
weapons technologies—had democratized the means of mass destruction,
reduced the salience of international
borders, and accelerated the speed with
which money and materiel could travel.
Inevitably, these changes undermined the logic of sovereign non-intervention principles. Within the national
security community, counterterrorism
concerns sparked the rapid emergence
of both normative and legal arguments
for expanding the basis for using force
within the territory of other states.
There were generally two strands
to these arguments. First, the traditional self-defense-based justification
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second strand of counterterrorismbased arguments justifying the use of
force does, however, reflect a deep shift
in understandings.
The argument comes into sharpest
focus when we consider drone strikes
and other cross-border uses of force
outside of “hot” battlefields. Since
2011, the United States has repeatedly used force inside the borders
of sovereign states with which we are
not at war, at times without the consent of the affected state. In October
2008, for instance, U.S. troops in Iraq
crossed the Syrian and attacked targets
inside Syria.13 The United States has
also attacked targets inside Pakistan,
Yemen, and Somalia. In some cases,

Counterterrorism concerns sparked the

rapid emergence of both normative and legal
arguments for expanding the basis for using
force within the territory of other states.
for using force was expanded, most
strikingly in the Bush Administration’s
embrace of so-called “preemptive” selfdefence, which was used to justify the
war in Iraq.12 The logic underlying the
Bush argument was straigt forward. In
the age of ballistic missiles and nuclear,
chemical, and biological threats, states
may only have a moment’s notice before
an imminent attack. Surely the framers of the UN Charter would not have
required states to wait for an “armed
attack” to occur or be imminent in the
traditional sense to lawfully use force in
self-defense?
This extension of the principle
of self-defense stretches traditional
understandings of sovereignty, but the

the affected states have consented to the
United States’ use of force. In other
cases, their consent is, at best, questionable.14
While the United States has been
reluctant to offer much detail or legal
justification for these actions, the logic
used appears structurally identical to
that embraced by the human rights and
humanitarian law communities: sovereignty implies responsibilities as well as
rights; states must refrain from internal
acts that threaten the citizens or basic
security of other states, and must prevent non-state entities from engaging
in such acts inside their borders. If
a state fails to fulfill this responsibility—by, for instance, harboring ter-

Summer/Fall 2012 [ 1 29]

STRANGE BEDFELLOWS

rorists—other states are entitled to use
force within its borders if doing so
is necessary to protect themselves or
uphold global security.15 As President
Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor John Brennan stated in a 2011
speech, “We reserve the right to take
unilateral action if or when other governments are unwilling or unable to
take the necessary actions themselves.”16

A Strange Convergence. The

human rights and national security discourses appear to have converged on
structurally parallel sovereignty-limiting theories—though neither community is entirely comfortable with the
logical implications taken for granted
by the other community.

notion that states have a responsibility to protect the populations of other
states from atrocities. The emerging
R2P doctrine has largely been greeted
in national security law quarters as
irrelevant or pernicious, likely to draw
the United States into diversionary foreign entanglements at the expense of
protecting our core national security
interests.
Meanwhile, those in the human
rights community are even more suspicious of the hard security discourse,
often finding the actions it enables
repugnant. To many in the human
rights and humanitarian legal communities, drone strikes and other uses of
force outside of “hot” battlefields are
seen as little more than extra-territo-

The human rights and national security

discourses appear to have converged on structurally parallel sovereignty-limiting theories.
One might even say that the R2P coin
ought logically to be seen as having two
sides. On one side lies a state’s duty to
take action inside its own territory to
protect its own population from violence
and atrocities. On the other side lies a
state’s duty to take action inside its own
territory to protect other states’ populations
from violence. Either way, a state that
fails in these duties faces the prospect
that other states will intervene in its
“internal” affairs without its consent.17
There is a substantial irony here:
human rights advocates and counterterrorism hawks make strange bedfellows. The “hard security” community,
historically realist in its orientation,
tends to be uncomfortable with the
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rial, extrajudicial executions—a flagrant
violation of international human rights
and rule of law principles.
Yet the logic of each sovereigntylimiting theory is virtually identical,
and each theory serves to legitimize the
other, though neither the human rights
community nor the national security community tends to want fully to
acknowledge this.
Whether the potential use of force is
justified on counterterrorism grounds
or on humanitarian and human rights
grounds, the potential for a slippery
slope is apparent. Those who would
justify either human rights-based interventions or counterterrorism-based
interventions should face precisely the
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same set of questions: Who gets to judge
when a state should be deemed to have
“waived” its sovereignty and abrogated
its responsibilities? Who gets to decide
when a use of force inside the border of
a non-consenting state is lawful? And
which actors get to use force? A single
state acting unilaterally? Regional organizations? Coalitions of the willing?
If each state claims the right to judge
for itself when force can be used inside
the borders of another state, the world
may become an even more frightening
and unstable place, given the continued
weakness of most existing international
institutions. Indeed, we risk a return to
the Hobbesian international order the
UN Charter was designed to eliminate.
This should trouble us—and it may
be particularly troubling for those in
the human rights community. After all,
it is the human rights community that
has traditionally been most concerned
with the integrity and normative value
of international law and institutions.
Those in the national security community may be inclined to take a less
apocalyptic view on the theory that the
Hobbesian world order has been with
us all along.
Yet, these sovereignty-limiting
theories emerge for compelling reasons, and reflect changed facts on the
ground. Sometimes states engage in
such egregious atrocities against their
own populations that morality, if not
law, appears to demand a response.
Sometimes states will be unwilling or
unable to take action against dangerous
terrorist groups operating inside their
borders—and in an age in which technologies, money, people and materiel
can cross borders rapidly and easily,
it seems unreasonable to expect other
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states, if threatened, to stand idly by.
The clock cannot be turned back.

What is to be done? The dilemmas

created by current sovereignty-limiting
doctrines are clear. It is less clear, however, what our response should be. Two
possible approaches exist.
First, of course, we might view this
as a call to get serious about addressing
the international rule of law problems
created by current sovereignty-limiting
doctrines, and begin the long, difficult
project of developing alternate forms of
restraint and accountability. We might
focus, for instance, on trying to create
a more responsive and representative
Security Council, one less likely to be
paralyzed by ideology and less vulnerable to charges of partiality and selfinterest.
Alternatively, we might seek to create
or adapt international judicial institutions to serve as a check on uses of
force: we might develop an international legal or normative framework
requiring states that wish to use force
for humanitarian or counterterrorism
reasons to seek prior (or retroactive)
approval from some relatively “objective” international judicial or quasijudicial body.
None of these projects would be
straightforward; each might be seen as
facing barriers so high as to be virtually
insurmountable. If the various institutional and legal “fixes” we might envision are unrealistic in the near term, is
there any responsible way forward?
The overall thrust of this essay has
been to call for intellectual honesty
about the logical implications of emerging sovereignty-limiting doctrines. But,
perhaps, this is one of those areas where
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discretion—even disingenuousness—is
the better part of valor, or at least the
better part of preserving stability.
Stephen Krasner makes a variant of
this argument in some of his recent
work. Krasner famously dubbed sovereignty “organized hypocrisy,” noting
that while the notion of “sovereignty” has long been associated with clear
legal criteria and rules, states have, for
just as long, routinely ignored those
rules when it suited them to do so.18
To Krasner, this organized hypocrisy
is nonetheless functional—or at least
more functional than any available
alternative.
In a 2010 essay on “The Durability of Organized Hypocrisy,” Krasner
argues that this remains true today.19 He
grants that emerging normative or legal
doctrines will continue to challenge
and delegitimize traditional notions of
sovereignty, and significant “shocks”—
such as “the possibility of mega-terrorist attacks”—might lead to radical

change: “Governments in advanced
countries would begin to reconfigure their bureaucratic structures to…
[reflect] new rules and principles about
responsibilities for territories or functions beyond national borders.”
But, argues Krasner, “Such fundamental challenges to the existing sovereignty regime are not to be welcomed.
Any new set of principles…would be
contested. External actors, even if their
claims were legitimated…would not
find it easy to exercise the authority they
had asserted…there are no formulaic
solutions.” Krasner concludes, “Sovereignty has worked very imperfectly
but it has still worked better than any
other structure that decision-makers
have been able to envision.”20
In other words: in the end, perhaps, when it comes to teasing out the
implications of emerging sovereigntylimiting doctrines, organized hypocrisy
is the best we can do.
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